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Abstract This paper proposes a simple mechanism aimed to establish positive
contributions to public goods in the absence of powerful institutions to sanction
free-riders. The idea of the mechanism is to require players to commit to the
public good by paying a deposit prior to the contribution stage. If all players
commit in this way, those players who do not contribute their share to the public
good forfeit their deposit. If there is no universal commitment, all deposits are
refunded and the standard game is played. Given deposits are sufficiently high,
prior commitment and full ex post contributions are part of a strict subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium for the resulting game. As the mechanism obviates
the need for any ex post prosecution of free-riders, it is particularly suited for
situations where players do not submit to a common authority as in the case of
international agreements.
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1 Introduction
One of the most prominent examples for the failure of markets concerns the
provision of public goods. The conflict of interest between the socially desirable
and individually optimal contribution to the public good commonly prevents
the implementation of Pareto optimal solutions — not only theoretically but also
empirically (e.g. Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000). Due to the often immense welfare gains
at stake (e.g. clean water/air), the question of how to establish high contribution
rates in public goods games is a key issue in economic policy.
An “easy” way out of such social dilemmas is the introduction of sanction-
ing institutions (e.g. a reliable jurisdiction) that enforce contributions to public
goods. Already casual evidence suggests that, once individual deviations from
previously agreed contribution rates can be appropriately punished, many public
goods can be — and indeed are — established at a level close to the social opti-
mum (e.g. public transport, health care, quiet sleeping hours at night). Evidence
from laboratory experiments further supports this observation (e.g. Falkinger et
al., 2000; Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000). In fact, more recent studies even show that
individuals, when facing the choice between a social environment with and with-
out sanctioning possibilities, learn to choose the environment with sanctioning
(Gu¨rerk et al., 2006; see also Kosfeld et al., 2006). Moreover, upon being placed
in the desired environment, most players indeed fully contribute to the public
good and punish free-riders (Gu¨rerk et al., 2006).
In order to be effective, however, sanctioning institutions have to be equipped
with the power necessary to enforce the respective punishment. This, of course,
is satisfied in case of local public goods, where governmental institutions exist
to back up the enforcement. Powerful sanctioning institutions were also taken
as given in the laboratory studies cited above. Yet, in a more and more glob-
alised world, an increasing number of public goods that do not belong to this
category have attracted considerable attention; most prominent among them are
environmental issues related to global warming (cf. Dutta and Radner, 2004).
Absent, e.g., a world government, effective sanctioning of free-riders is difficult
to establish in these cases. Accordingly, the optimal provision of public goods
is more awkward and we often witness considerable difficulties in implementing
actions that were informally agreed upon (e.g. climate-change treaties like the
Kyoto Protocol).
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In the present paper we take up this issue and propose a simple mechanism
aimed to establish full contribution to a public good in cases where effective ex
post sanctioning is difficult, if not impossible, to enforce. The idea of the mecha-
nism is to allow players to take an action, prior to the contribution stage, which
renders full contribution to the public good a dominant strategy. More specifi-
cally, we consider a 2-stage variation of a general public goods game. In stage 1,
players can choose to pay a deposit to a neutral institution. If at the end of stage
1 everyone has paid a deposit, then in stage 2 the public goods game is played
and deposits are refunded to those who contribute to the public good. If some
player has not paid the deposit, all deposits are refunded (potentially deducting
a small fee to sustain the institution administering deposits) and the standard
public goods game is played in stage 2. Obviously, universal commitment in the
form of paying the deposit as well as full contributions to the public good now
can be rationalised as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the resulting game.
Moreover, as players essentially execute their own punishment (pay the deposit),
the neutral institution considered here only has to resist demands to repay for-
feited deposits. This, however, appears far easier to enforce than collecting fines
from free-riders ex post.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce and
analyse our mechanism. A discussion of the mechanism is provided in Section 3.
2 The Mechanism
We consider a generalised standard public goods game PGs with n players. In
PGs, each player i, i = 1, ..., n, chooses a level of contribution to a public good,
ci, from an idiosyncratic set of possible contributions, i.e. ci ∈ [0, c¯i], where c¯i > 0
can be thought of as the socially desired contribution of player i.1 Payoffs for
each player i are given by
pisi (c) = ei − aici + bi
∑
j
cj ,
1We comment on the determinants of c¯i at the end of this section.
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where c := (c1, ..., cn), ei is player i’s initial endowment and ai (bi) denotes player
i’s marginal cost (benefit) of contributing one further unit to the public good.2
Hence, we explicitly allow for heterogeneity among the players. In order to guar-
antee that the players’ payoffs reflect the common public goods structure, we
assume:
Assumption A: For all i, it holds that ai > bi > ai
c¯i∑
j c¯j
.
Proposition 1 is well known and straightforward to prove.
Proposition 1 The strategy profile c0 with c0i = 0 for all i is the unique Nash
equilibrium for PGs. Moreover, c0i = 0 is a strictly dominant strategy for all i.
Yet, under Assumption A, c0 is Pareto dominated by c¯ = (c¯1, . . . , c¯n):
pisi (c¯) = ei − aic¯i + bi
∑
j
c¯j > ei = pi
s
i (c
0) for all i.
To implement full contribution, i.e. c¯, consider the following 2-stage variation
of PGs.
Stage 1 All players simultaneously choose to pay a deposit di ∈ {0, d¯i} to a
neutral institution, e.g. a fund. At the end of stage 1, the profile of all deposits
paid, denoted by d, is revealed to the players. Thereafter, the game enters stage 2.
Stage 2 The interaction in this stage depends on d in the following way. If at the
end of stage 1 we have di = 0 for some i, then in stage 2 the public goods game
PGs is played. If, however, at the end of stage 1 we have di = d¯i for all i, then
in stage 2 a public goods game PG∗ is played for which payoffs are as follows:
pi∗i (c) =

ei − d¯i − aici + bi
∑
j cj, if ci < c¯i
ei − aici + bi
∑
j cj, if ci = c¯i.
2We do not necessarily assume monetary contributions. For example, ci can be some measure
of reducing carbon dioxide emissions, which has a marginal cost of ai and a marginal benefit
of bi for player i.
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Thus, if all players have decided to pay their deposit, these deposits are only
refunded to those players who contribute to the public good in the previously
agreed way, i.e. for whom ci = c¯i.
The 2-stage game defined above is denoted by P̂G. A strategy for player i in
P̂G is given by a tuple (di, cˆi), where
cˆi : {0, d¯1} × . . .× {0, d¯n} → [0, c¯i].
The following result is readily established:
Proposition 2 Assume that d¯i > (ai − bi)c¯i for all i. Then, the strategy profile
(d¯, cˆ∗) where d¯ = (d¯1 . . . , d¯n) and
cˆ∗i (d) =

0, if dj = 0 for some j
c¯i, if dj = d¯j for all j
is a strict subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of P̂G. Moreover, for all i, cˆ∗i is
a strictly dominant strategy at stage 2 and d¯i is a dominant strategy at stage 1,
given that play continues with the strategy profile cˆ∗ at stage 2.
Proof. Consider stage 2 first. If dj = 0 for some j, then PG
s is played in
stage 2. In this case, cˆ∗i (d) = 0 for all i is the unique Nash equilibrium and it
is in strictly dominant strategies (cf. Proposition 1). If dj = d¯j for all j, then
ci = c¯i is a strictly dominant strategy for player i in PG
∗. To see this, let c−i be
an arbitrary profile of contributions for all players except i. Then,
pi∗i (c¯i, c−i) > pi
∗
i (ci, c−i) for all ci < c¯i
⇐⇒ (bi − ai)c¯i > (bi − ai)ci − d¯i for all ci < c¯i
⇐⇒ d¯i > (ai − bi)c¯i
which is satisfied by assumption. Hence, cˆ∗i (d) as given in the statement of the
proposition, is the unique Nash equilibrium in stage 2 and it is in strictly dominant
strategies. What remains to be shown is that d¯i is a dominant strategy for player
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i at stage 1 given that play continues with cˆ∗. Consider first the case where dj = 0
for some j 6= i. Then,
pisi (cˆ
∗(d¯i, d−i)) = ei = pisi (cˆ
∗(0, d−i)).
Next, consider the case where dj = d¯j, for all j 6= i. Then,
pi∗i (cˆ
∗(d¯i, d−i)) = ei − aic¯i + bi
∑
j
c¯j > ei = pi
s
i (cˆ
∗(0, d−i)),
which is satisfied by Assumption A.
As we have seen in the proof of Proposition 2, for any deposit profile d there
is a unique equilibrium cˆ∗(d) at stage 2 of P̂G. This is not true for stage 1 since
d¯i is only weakly dominant for player i. Any tuple (d, cˆ
∗), with di = 0 for at least
two i, also constitutes a Nash equilibrium of P̂G. In such an equilibrium, there is
no contribution to the public good at stage 2. However, di = 0 is not a dominant
strategy for player i, given that play continues with cˆ∗. In fact, (d¯, cˆ∗) is the
unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in stage-wise dominant strategies.
As a last step, we show that the above result remains to hold if the institution
collecting and administering the deposits is assumed to be costly, and if players,
when paying their deposits, have to bear a small share of this cost. To see this,
consider following variation of P̂G, denoted by P˜G. Different from the previous
case, assume now that a fraction ε > 0 of any deposit made is kept for the
maintenance of the respective institution. Thus, if at the end of stage 1 we have
di = 0 for some i, then in stage 2 the game PG
s is played except that now player
i’s payoff function is given by:
p˜isi (c) =

ei − εd¯i − aici + bi
∑
j cj, if di = d¯i
ei − aici + bi
∑
j cj, if di = 0.
If at the end of stage 1 we have di = d¯i for all i, then again PG
∗ is played with
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the following modification of the players’ payoff functions:
p˜i∗i (c) =

ei − d¯i − aici + bi
∑
j cj, if ci < c¯i
ei − εd¯i − aici + bi
∑
j cj, if ci = c¯i.
The next proposition shows that under these modifications, everyone paying
the deposit in stage 1 and full contributions to the public good in stage 2 still
can be implemented as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of P˜G. The proof of
Proposition 3 is immediate.
Proposition 3 Let ε > 0 be such that d¯i(1−ε) > (ai−bi)c¯i and bi
∑
j c¯j > aic¯i+
εd¯i for all i. Then there are exactly two subgame perfect Nash equilibria (d
∗, cˆ∗)
of P˜G. In one equilibrium, d∗i = d¯i for all i in stage 1; in the other equilibrium
d∗i = 0 for all i in stage 1. In both equilibria cˆ
∗ is as given in Proposition 2. Both
equilibria are strict.
To conclude our analysis, we finally discuss the determinants of the share c¯i
player i can be expected to contribute to the public good. In order to do so, let us
interpret player i’s endowment, ei, as the maximum wealth player i is generally
able/willing to invest into the provision of the public good, and let us assume
that this is undisputed among players. Then, for feasibility reasons, it must be
true that d¯i+ aic¯i ≤ ei. As we have seen, the implementation of full contribution
to the public good requires that d¯i ≥ (ai − bi)c¯i.3 Hence, c¯i is bounded above
by ei/(2ai − bi). Thus, ceteris paribus, the larger player i’s initial endowment ei,
the larger her marginal benefit bi derived from the public good, and the lower
the marginal cost ai, the larger is the contribution c¯i player i can be asked to
contribute to the public good. Yet, maximal contributions c¯i = ei/(2ai − bi) for
all i are only feasible if Assumption A is satisfied, i.e. if
bi
∑
j
ej
2aj − bj > ai
ei
2ai − bi for all i.
Accordingly, if plans are too ambitious regarding the targeted level of contri-
butions to the public good, its provision may fail simply because of the play-
ers’ budget constraints. This seems to be particularly relevant if we consider,
3For the sake of simplicity we neglect any costs for administering deposits.
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for example, the desired effort levels to reduce the output of green-house gases.
However, if the technology for producing the public good allows for a stepwise
production process, then the mechanism proposed in this paper still can be used
effectively since the target level of the public good can be achieved by a series
of incremental increases. Contributions to the public good could, for example,
be evaluated on an annual (monthly, . . . ) basis. If all contributions are found
to be made as expected, existing deposits are paid back, so that again enough
funds are available for the implementation of the next incremental increase in the
public good.
3 Discussion
We have proposed a simple two-stage mechanism which implements full contri-
butions to the public good in a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Similar to a
smoker who publicly announces to refrain from smoking in order to make failure
prohibitively costly (or a co-author who freely promises to deliver a revised ver-
sion of the paper by the end of the week),4 players in our mechanism can pay an
ex ante deposit which, if paid by all, renders contributing to the public good a
dominant strategy. This mechanism has favourable properties which we discuss
in the following.
First, our mechanism implements the provision of public goods in a strict
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. If the cost for running the institution that
administers deposits is negligible, the implementation can even be achieved in a
stage-wise dominant strategy equilibrium. Hence, even though there exist zero-
contribution equilibria as well, the coordination problem is less severe than in
case of equilibria that are non-strict or not in dominant strategies.
Second, and most importantly, our mechanism does not require the presence
or establishment of powerful institutions to implement full contributions to the
public good (cf. Falkinger et al., 2000; Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000; Gu¨rek et al., 2006;
Kosfeld et al., 2006). The reason is that no ex post punishment of free-riders is
required. All that is needed is an independent institution (e.g. the world bank)
4Whether announcements are strong enough to later enforce the desired action may be
questionable. Their frequent use, however, indicates that the targeted commitment effect indeed
is very similar to the one used in our mechanism.
8
that collects deposits, monitors the players’ contributions and refunds deposits
to those who have contributed to the public good. Hence, our mechanism is
particularly suited to implement international agreements like the Kyoto Pro-
tocol, where there is no common authority that can enforce the punishment of
free-riders.
In many situations, like in the case of global warming, there is a general
consensus among the affected parties that the provision of a particular public
good is desirable. Yet, at the same time everyone knows that ex post there is a
strong incentive to free ride on the contributions of others. Hence, societies who
in principle are willing to provide a particular public good (e.g. clean air) can be
expected to agree to the implementation of a self-sanctioning scheme (the deposit)
which helps them to adhere to their intended contribution ex post. In fact, the
mechanism proposed here is indeed quite similar to a self-sanctioning mechanism.
Players themselves submit the deposit and, hence, can also easily be assigned
the burden of proof that they contributed to the public good. Consequently,
the institution in our case essentially has to administer the deposits, while its
monitoring role is rather weak. This is different for a punishing institution,
which — in line with conventional legal systems — has to prove that a free-rider
did not contribute to the public good.
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